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We investigate the moderating role of corruption on the effect of government research 
and development (R&D) expenditure on enterprise innovation in China, using annual 
data from 2002 to 2013 in a panel of 30 provinces. Our findings show that R&D 
expenditure does not influence the number of patent applications, but it does influence 
the number of patents granted. When considering official corruption, the interaction 
term of R&D expenditure and corruption has a statistically significantly positive effect 
on the numbers of patent applications and patents granted, with corruption having 
significantly positive effects on the ratio of the number of patents granted to the 
number of patent applications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The dynamic mechanism of innovation has drawn the attention of many economists 
since Schumpeter (1934) noted the importance of innovation’s effect on economic 
growth. Nelson (1971) and Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that innovation is 
commonly considered a public good while being usually combined with positive 
externality (Delong and Lawrence, 1991). However, given that innovation’s 
positive externality can lead to market failure, especially if an innovation project’s 
positive benefits to society are unable to cover the firm’s private costs, one outcome 
is that the project will not be implemented and, thus, the volume of innovations 
does not meet the socially desirable target. To solve the problem of positive 
externality, Cropper and Oates (1992) argue that public expenditure is the most 
suitable method after comparing taxes, public expenditures, making markets, and 
establishing property rights and regulations, because it allows for subsidies to 
equal the marginal external benefit of positive externality, thus resolving a market 
supply shortage.
Many studies analyze the relation between government research and 
development (R&D) expenditure and innovation, but there are wide differences 
between their empirical results (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). Some scholars contend 
that R&D expenditures are complementary to financing a firm’s R&D spending 
(Bronzini and Piselli, 2016) while others perceive R&D expenditures crowding 
out private R&D spending (Boeing, 2016; David, Hall, and Toole, 2000). Vicente, 
Borrego, Forcadell, and Galan (2014) believe that these disparities mainly arise 
due to different methodologies, sample countries, and variables. Most research 
studies thus commonly neglect the role of institutional quality when investigating 
the impact of R&D on innovation, which is a key focus of this paper.
According to rent-seeking theory, when government corruption is high, a 
large number of enterprises of low innovation ability could receive R&D subsidies 
through bribery. These enterprises do not have enough innovative achievements 
to apply for patents, so the growth of R&D expenditure cannot promote the 
corresponding growth of enterprise patent applications. On the contrary, when the 
degree of government corruption is low, enterprises with low innovation ability 
have less chance of obtaining R&D projects or R&D funding support through 
bribery. R&D subsidies are more likely to be given to enterprises or research 
institutes with high innovation ability and the amount of patent applications of 
enterprises will increase accordingly (Krueger, 1974; Fey, 2008; Gao, 2011).
Unlike traditional work, which focuses only on the link between R&D 
expenditures and innovation, as well as that between corruption and innovation 
separately, we concentrate our attention on merging these variables. Our 
contribution can be interpreted as follows. We employ a panel system generalized 
method of moments (GMM) method and subject it to data on 30 Chinese provinces 
(including administered municipalities). This paper develops a fundamental 
model for analyzing how R&D expenditure affects enterprise innovations in China 
when exposed to corruption. In our analysis, domestic innovation is measured by 
the number of patent applications accepted (NPA), the number of patents granted 
(NPG), and the ratio of the number of patents granted to the number of patent 
applications (RGA) over the period 2002 to 2013. We then carry out robustness 
tests where the full samples are split into eastern, central, and western regions of 
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5 See also Waldemar (2012) and Amir and Burr (2015).
6 Similarly, bribery can help enterprises avoid red tape, lower the risks of administrative intervention 
to enterprise innovation, and reduce credit discrimination during the financing process (Qian and 
Xu, 1998; Yeh, Shu, and Chiu, 2013).
7 Well-organized networks mean strong coordination among bureaucrats.
China. These regions vary considerably in their economic and social development. 
As far as we know, ours is the first study to investigate the relationship between 
R&D expenditures, corruption, and innovative activity. 
Although the previous literature recognizes that corruption can dramatically 
affect firm behavior (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, and Eden, 2006), we note that 
the actual effect of corruption on innovation is less understood in earlier works, 
since studies report surprising disparity over corruption’s influence on domestic 
innovation. For instance, scholars argue that corruption can increase transaction 
costs and risk for entrepreneurs, which can negatively influence innovation. 
Anokhin and Schulze (2009) argue that in the face of high corruption, controlling 
corruption can exert a greater impact on innovative activity. Specifically, Rose-
Ackerman (2001) provides persuasive arguments on how the control of corruption 
links to the development of “institutionalized trust,” which is instrumental in 
creating innovation, and also results in high levels of value-added economic 
activity in innovation investment.
Baker, Peli, Knouf, and Kanwisher (2005) and Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, and 
Eden (2006) suggest that corruption has implications for rewards from innovation. 
Similarly, corruption negatively influences a firm’s growth, as, for instance, in the 
cases of Uganda and Central and Eastern European countries (see, Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007; and De Rosa, Gooroochurn and Gorg, 2010).5 Finally, corruption 
can hurt an enterprise’s innovation because it can lead to the distortion of resource 
allocation (Baumol, 1990; Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998).
Given the argument that corruption spurs innovation, Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1991) suggest that officials have monopoly power over the demand for 
bribes, though such public rent-seeking activities commonly shock innovators 
due to cash constraint.6 Furthermore, scholars have argued that well organized 
corruption networks positively influence innovative performance (Blackburn 
and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Goedhuys, Mohnen, and Taha, 2016).7 According to 
these views, bribery appears to help overcome government ineffectiveness thus 
impeding efficient innovative activities (Williams, Martinez-Perez, and Kedir, 
2016). Compared to the growing research documenting that corruption and 
innovation are negatively related, we offer some in-depth arguments.
China’s economy has enjoyed remarkable economic growth rates of 
approximately 10% per year in the past few decades and R&D funds in the 
country have grown at around 20% per annum (Guo, Guo, and Jiang, 2016; Shi 
and Rao, 2010). However, the innovation level is low compared to the rapidly 
increasing economy and R&D funds, mainly manifested by the small contribution 
of productivity to economic growth. How is R&D expenditure, corruption, and 
innovation related? What is the role of corruption in this relation? These are the 
questions we answer. Our empirical results have strong policy implications for 
R&D expenditure, anticorruption, and government efficiency in China.
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8 Corruption serves as speed money, which then increases efficiency by expediting the decision-
making process (Leff, 1964).
To sum up, we investigate the moderating role of corruption on the effect 
of R&D expenditure on enterprise innovation in China using the panel system 
GMM method. The method is employed on a dataset consisting of 30 Chinese 
provinces over the period 2002 to 2013. The relation between R&D expenditure 
and enterprise innovation will be thoroughly scrutinized while considering the 
influence of corruption.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the past several decades, R&D expenditure and institution quality have been 
the two most important factors determining the level of enterprise innovation. For 
example, several studies have shown that, given information asymmetry between 
capitalists and entrepreneurs, R&D expenditure can expropriate innovative ideas 
via financial tunneling from the investee (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006). In other 
words, these studies find that government expenditure, aside from improving 
innovation, contributes to the positive externality of innovation, consistent with 
Griliches (1986). However, these findings are quite different from those of David 
et al. (2000), who find that the effect of R&D expenditure on an enterprise’s 
innovation is unclear, owing to government expenditure having a crowding-out 
effect on private R&D expenditure.
Several studies investigate the relationship between government and private 
R&D expenditures. The literature argues that R&D expenditure mainly plays a 
complementary role when compared to private R&D (Diamond, 1999). Other 
papers, however, critically note that R&D expenditure can crowd out private R&D 
expenditure (Wallsten, 2000). Accordingly, though R&D expenditure is a critical 
input for enterprise innovation, the empirical results are mixed, as in earlier 
arguments, given that most findings present methodological differences.
Recent papers investigate the role of R&D subsidies from the perspective 
of their differences. Le and Jaffe (2017), for example, consider research from 
the perspective of the innovation level of subsidiary objects and find that R&D 
subsidies are important to innovation. Hence, Cin et al. (2017) and Choi and 
Lee (2017), among others, show that R&D subsidies positively influence R&D 
expenditure and small business productivity from the perspective of enterprise 
scale. From the perspective of absorptive capacity, Guisado-González et al. (2018) 
find that outgoing spillover effects of R&D subsidies depend on the absorptive 
capacity of cooperative partners.
The literature on how institution quality affects enterprise innovation 
is also controversial. From the viewpoint that corruption is the lubricant of 
enterprise innovation, Leff (1964) believes that corruption not only efficiently 
reduces government intervention in business environments, but also provides 
an advantageous motivation for enterprise innovation in developing countries. 
Scholars, hence, argue that corruption provides an institutional arrangement of 
a fee-based service (Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998).8 Indeed, the bribe relationship 
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between enterprises and government acts as an important credit mechanism 
from the perspective of innovative activities and easing the financial restraint of 
enterprises under asymmetric information (Yeh et al., 2013).
The literature presents alternative arguments too. Baumol (1990), for instance, 
discusses the obstruction of corruption on enterprise innovation. He notes that, 
once the benefits of enterprises from a nonproductive activity such as bribery 
become greater than those from productive activity innovation, the enterprises 
may invest more resources into rent-seeking while reducing R&D investments. 
Similar evidence from Indian data have been found by Waldemar (2012). Similarly, 
Murphy et al. (1991) lament that corruption leads to the distortion of the allocation 
of entrepreneurial talents, which can hurt enterprises’ innovation ability (Tanzi, 
1998; Ahlin and Bose, 2007). Anokhin and Schulze (2009) show that the effect of 
corruption on innovative action exhibits the terms of a curvilinear relationship and 
outline both negative and positive relationships between the control of corruption 
and innovative activities among their sample countries.9
Dreher and Gassebner (2013) argue that corruption has a positive impact on 
firm innovation via reducing uncertainty in the decision-making process and by 
providing a way to overcome bureaucratic obstacles. Dirienzo and Das (2014) 
discover that corruption significantly harms innovation activities; Paunov (2016) 
documents the impacts of corruption on smaller and larger firms’ adoption of 
quality certification and patents in 48 developing and emerging countries. This 
study shows evidence that corruption reduces the likelihood of firms obtaining 
quality certificates, particularly for smaller firms.
Several works also investigate the relationship between institution quality 
and R&D expenditure. Shleifer and Vishny (1994), for example, investigate the 
privatization of state firms and point out that government subsidies for enterprises 
are used not only in strategies to create rent but also for the purpose of managerial 
bribes. In addition, Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou (2008) show that the role of the 
Communist Party of China in the operation of private enterprise is to construct 
political relations in place of a market mechanism. Enterprises can build up 
political relations by rent seeking and then obtaining scarce resources during their 
startup phase (Krueger, 1974; Glaeser and Saks, 2006).
Some studies have also investigated the relationship between R&D expenditure 
and innovation in China. Among these, that of Shi and Rao (2010) points out the 
contradiction between high R&D input and low innovation output in China, 
attributing this strange phenomenon to the problems of Chinese research culture, 
in which most researchers spend too much time building political connections and 
not enough time conducting academic research. Given that corruption can reduce 
government intervention for these enterprises, the analysis framework must 
account for institution quality to determine how R&D expenditure influences 
enterprise innovation. The resultant research finding is worthwhile as it seeks to 
extend our knowledge of corruption and innovation in emerging countries.
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 21, Number 3, January 2019414
III. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK, METHODS, AND DATA
A. Econometric models
To investigate whether corruption influences the effect of R&D expenditure on 
enterprise innovation, we first propose the following empirical framework: 
(1)
(2)
(3)
where INN proxies for the innovation variable, GRD is R&D expenditure, and 
X stands for control variables that can influence enterprise innovation. We consider 
economic development, foreign direct investment, foreign trade openness, and 
regional dummy variables, including the eastern, central, and western regions. 
In Equation (1), μi captures individual effect, ηt captures time-scale effect, εit is the 
estimated residual, with t=1,…,T periods and i=1,…N panel members.
The coefficient of GRD in Equation (1) captures the effects of R&D expenditure 
on enterprise innovation. However, one drawback is that, once the initial level of 
the explained variable is correlated with an error term, then using ordinary least 
squares estimator could lead to bias estimates. To solve such a problem, we use 
the dynamic panel GMM model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano 
and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998).
Equation (1) is first differenced such that country-specific effects are eliminated:
where Δ denotes the first difference. We thus propose a system GMM 
estimator that stacks level and difference equations. The lagged levels are used as 
instruments for the first-differenced variables and the lagged first difference of the 
series as instruments for the level variables.
According to our earlier interpretations, we note the effect of R&D expenditure 
on enterprise innovation could depend on the level of corruption (COR). 
Furthermore, we extend Equations (1) and (2) and evaluate the effect of GRD and 
its interaction effects with COR on INN. Hence, we estimate the following model:
B. Data
The empirical test is conducted on annual data for the period 2002 to 2013 in a 
panel of 30 provinces in China. The specific provinces are shown as Figures 1 to 4.
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Figure 1. Total NPA in China
This figure shows the number of patent applications (NPA) of 30 provinces in China (2002-2013).
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Figure 2.  Total NPG in China
This figure shows the number of patents granted (NPG) of 30 provinces in China (2002-2013).
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Figure 3. NPA in 2002 and 2013
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This figure shows the number of patent applications (NPA) of 30 provinces in China in 2002 and 2013.
Figure 4. NPG in 2002 and 2013
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This figure shows the number of patents granted (NPG) of 30 provinces in China in 2002 and 2013.
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B1. Dependent variables: Measurements of innovation
We provide several definitions of innovation. Domestic innovative activity 
is proxied by the number of patent applications (NPA) filed by residents and 
nonresidents. Several studies define this as the innovation output variable (Hall and 
Lerner, 2010; Barbosa et al., 2014). In robustness tests, we consider two alternative 
measures of innovation. First, the literature has employed the number of patents 
granted (NPG) to reflect different dimensions of enterprise innovation (Desyllas 
and Hughes, 2010). We, therefore, also use NPG. Second, following Hirshleifer et 
al. (2012), we calculate the ratio of the number of patents granted to the number 
of patent applications, commonly recognized as the NPA–NPG ratio (RGA). The 
values for both NPA and NPG are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook.
As can be seen, both NPA and NPG are mainly concentrated in the eastern 
and central regions, which encompass the more developed areas of China. The 
provinces with higher NPA values include Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Guangdong, and Shandong. Anhui also has a higher NPA value because there 
are more universities and research organizations there, which provides strong 
support for enterprise innovation ability. In the western region, we find no clear 
enterprise innovative activity, except in Sichuan, which has higher NPA and NPG 
values than the other areas. Furthermore, Anhui and Hebei are interesting because 
Anhui has a large NPA value but a lower NPG value, which is the opposite of 
Hebei. Figures 3 and 4 display the changes in enterprise innovation levels for each 
province between 2002 and 2013. We again find that the NPA and NPG values are 
higher in both the eastern and central regions compared to the western region.
B2. Independent variables
We next introduce several independent variables that impact innovation.
Government R&D expenditure (GRD): Economists believe that GRD is 
an important way to solve the problem of market failure during the process of 
enterprise innovation. By comparison, enterprises that receive R&D subsidies can 
cut their marginal cost of innovation and carry out more innovation activities. 
On the other hand, higher profits from innovation spillover effects arise because 
government expenditures not only improve innovation but also contribute to its 
positive externality (Ueda, 2004). Therefore, we argue that R&D expenditure plays 
a critical role in encouraging enterprise innovation in China. R&D expenditure 
data is obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook.
Government corruption (COR): Estimation of the extent of corruption for 
Chinese provinces is challenging. In this regard, we follow Dong and Torgler 
(2013), by considering the number of registered cases of corruption per 100,000 
people in a province as a proxy for the degree/extent of corruption. This paper 
thus uses COR as the key explanatory variable and the data are collected from 
the Procuratorial Yearbook of China. We summarize all corruption cases in every 
province as shown in Figures 5 and 6. According to Figure 5, corruption cases 
are concentrated in the eastern and central regions, which is consistent with the 
regional distribution of the number of enterprise patent applications. However, 
Qinghai has more corruption cases in the western region, which could be due to 
the rich natural resources there. Hence, in Figure 6, we find that the corruption 
level has not obviously dropped from 2002 to 2013.
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Figure 5. Total COR in China
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This figure shows the average of government corruption (COR) of 30 provinces in China (2002-2013). Government corruption is the 
number of registered cases of corruption per 100,000 people.
Figure 6. COR in 2002 and 2013
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This figure shows the number of government corruption (COR) of 30 provinces in China in 2002 and 2013. Government corruption 
is the number of registered cases of corruption per 100,000 people.
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An additional issue is the role of other variables that may affect innovation. 
We control for all such variables, conditional on data availability. First economic 
development matters as it considered to be the main factor that influences 
innovation ability (Cheung and Lin, 2004). In a similar tone, Anokhin and Schulze 
(2009) argue that the level of social wealth influences enterprise innovation. 
Therefore, we use the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant 
2000 currency units (GDP) to proxy for economic development.
Second is foreign direct investment (FDI) as argued in the work of Wang 
and Kafouros (2009) and Kennel (2007). Following these studies, foreign capital 
disbursed to the regional GDP (ratio form) is used to measure FDI levels.
Finally, foreign trade is also a contributor to enterprise innovation. On the 
one hand, domestic enterprises can learn from foreign competitors and customers 
through their exports abroad and thus have an opportunity to increase innovation 
performance (Kokko, 1996; Salomon and Shaver, 2005). On the other hand, it is 
helpful for domestic enterprises to learn the technology and new business thinking 
of foreign enterprises by importing their advanced products. Thus, we include as 
a control variable the value of regional total imports and exports to the regional 
GDP, OPEN. The variables GDP, FDI, and OPEN are obtained from the China 
Statistical Yearbook.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Effects of government R&D expenditure on enterprise innovation
Of the independent variables GRD, COR, GDP, FDI, and OPEN, COR and FDI 
are exogenous (Paunov, 2016; Kennel, 2007). The variables GRD and GDP are 
endogenous because regional innovative ability can affect the level of economic 
development and R&D expenditures to a certain extent (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009; Cin et al., 2017) and foreign trade could be correlated with the missing 
variables (Salomon and Shaver, 2005). To ensure maximum efficiency, instruments 
are proxied by lagged values of endogenous variables (as in Beck et al., 2000). The 
GMM regression estimates for the dependent variable NPA are displayed in Table 
1 and the regional dummy variables are excluded from regression (1). 
To start, Table 1 shows that GDP, FDI, and OPEN are statistically different 
from zero (and carry a positive sign) at the 5% level in most equations (columns 
(1) and (3) for GDP; all specifications for FDI; and columns (1), (2), and (4) for 
OPEN), suggesting that higher real per capita GDP, foreign direct investment, and 
trade contribute to an increase in innovation. However, although the coefficient 
of GRD is positive in all equations, the coefficient is not statistically significant, 
meaning that R&D expenditure does not significantly increase the number of 
patent applications for enterprises in China. In other words, R&D expenditure 
does not have the expected effect during the sample period.
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Table 1.
Effects of Government R&D Expenditure on NPA
This table shows the effects of government R&D expenditure on the number of patent applications. The t-statistics are given in 
parentheses following each coefficient. Finally, * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively.
NPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPAt-1 0.097** 0.217** 0.619** 0.524**
[5.319] [6.024] [3.165] [3.461]
GRD 0.145 0.456 0.845 0.561
[0.069] [0.561] [1.078] [0.079]
GDP 0.461** 0.461 0.231* 0.204
[4.236] [0.632] [1.951] [0.297]
FDI 0.102** 0.256** 0.679** 0.155**
[7.048] [2.134] [8.427] [5.732]
OPEN 0.503** 0.367** 0.518 0.641**
[3.145] [4.625] [0.512] [4.327]
Eastern 0.561**
[7.019]
Central 0.336**
[6.942]
Western -0.167
[-1.642]
Observations 330 330 330 330
AR test (1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
AR test (2) 0.433 0.357 0.389 0.304
Instruments 13 9 7 5
Hansen test 0.348 0.409 0.309 0.385
We next investigate the estimated results of three regional dummy variables. 
The variables Eastern and Central are statistically different from zero (at the 5% 
level) and carry a positive sign in columns (2) and (3), respectively, which implies 
that the eastern and central regions of China have relatively higher quantities of 
patent applications. However, this is not the case for the western region, since the 
coefficient of Western is not significant in column (4).
The results for NPG as the dependent variable are shown in Table 2. We find 
the interesting result that GRD is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level in all specifications, implying that larger R&D expenditures are associated 
with higher NPG values. In comparison with Table 1, we provide evidence that 
GRD has a clearer impact on NPG than on NPA though both proxies for innovation 
output.
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This table shows the effects of government R&D expenditure on the number of patents granted. The t-statistics are given in 
parentheses following each coefficient. Finally, ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
NPG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPGt-1 0.661** 0.600** 0.431** 0.607**
[9.812] [7.415] [5.246] [7.322]
GRD 0.411** 0.284** 0.201** 0.421**
[6.154] [5.364] [2.197] [7.459]
GDP 0.369** 0.437** 0.635** 0.261**
[8.752] [9.762] [1.968] [3.217]
FDI 0.206** 0.261** 0.403 0.654**
[4.513] [7.149] [1.351] [4.988]
OPEN 0.154** 0.199** 0.361** 0.451**
[6.931] [6.572] [8.763] [7.445]
Eastern 0.134**
[5.061]
Central 0.163**
[2.661]
Western 0.125
[0.681]
Observations 330 330 330 330
ARtest (1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
ARtest (2) 0.534 0.315 0.315 0.335
Instruments 17 11 9 7
Hansen test 0.432 0.298 0.298 0.589
Table 2.
 Effects of Government R&D Expenditure on NPG
As seen in Table 2, the estimated results of GDP, FDI, and OPEN are very 
similar to our earlier findings; the only exception is the variable FDI in column 
(3). Furthermore, the dummy variables Eastern and Central are still positive and 
statistically significant at conventional levels in columns (2) and (3), respectively, 
in Table 2. The regional effect of Western, however, is weaker in column (4) and 
statistically insignificant. As anticipated, these results are also in line with the view 
that the eastern and central areas exhibit higher degrees of economic development 
in China and also generate greater competition in enterprise innovative activity, 
leading to high levels of innovation performance.
We finally consider the effect of the autoregressive parameter. The lagged 
dependent variable statistically different from zero (at the 5% level) and carries 
a positive sign in all columns in Tables 1 and 2. The implication is that past 
levels of innovation performance are significantly associated with current levels 
of innovation output. In particular, provinces that experienced high levels of 
innovation performance in the past will continue to do so in the future. We also 
check whether there is autocorrelation in the error term and present the results in 
Tables 1 and 2. The Arellano–Bond test shows no evidence of autocorrelation and 
the Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis that all the IVs are effective. The 
test results show that system GMM estimation is suitable for our empirical model.
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B. Effects of corruption and government R&D expenditure on innovation
To further check the effect of corruption on innovation and determine whether 
bribery contributes to enterprises receiving R&D funding, which then increases 
the possibility of innovation in China, we add COR and its interaction with GRD 
to model (3). The dependent variables NPA and NPG are displayed in Tables 3 and 
4, respectively.
This table shows the effects of corruption and government R&D expenditure on the number of patents applications. The t-statistics 
are given in parentheses following each coefficient. Finally, ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
NPA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPAt-1 0.299** 0.251** 0.452** 0.091**
[4.267] [6.114] [5.315] [6.231]
GRD 0.101 -0.413 0.061 0.462
[1.108] [-1.035] [1.088] [0.317]
COR 0.215** 0.651** 0.464** 0.463
[4.532] [3.564] [3.524] [1.549]
GRD*COR 0.314** 0.415** 0.641** 0.615
[6.195] [5.615] [9.451] [0.881]
GDP 0.512** 0.326** 0.752** 0.319**
[7.411] [2.981] [6.422] [6.495]
FDI 0.294** 0.274** 0.543** 0.471**
[8.463] [2.343] [3.545] [3.251]
OPRN 0.381** 0.213** 0.066 0.267**
[7.125] [6.446] [1.293] [6.224]
Eastern 0.209**
[5.881]
Eastern*COR 0.431**
[7.049]
Central 0.383**
[5.141]
Central*COR 0.251**
[8.572]
Western -0.672
[-0.243]
Western*COR 0.145
[0.459]
Observations 328 328 328 328
ARtest (1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ARtest (2) 0.612 0.733 0.438 0.438
Instruments 17 11 9 7
Hansen test 0.233 0.409 0.654 0.329
Table 3. 
Effects of Corruption and Government R&D Expenditure on NPA
For Table 3, the effect of GRD on NPA is still statistically zero in columns (1) 
to (4); however, the variable COR has a positive impact on NPA and is statistically 
different from zero in columns (1) to (3) but statistically insignificant in column 
(4). It is important to note that, because China has no perfect market mechanism, 
the government usually plays a critical role in intervening in economic activities. 
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Under such circumstances, most enterprises tend to offer bribes to government 
officials to avoid political risk, which leads to rampant official corruption and low 
institution quality. Therefore, bribery becomes a way to reduce administrative 
intervention, avoid bureaucratic red tape, and facilitate enterprise innovation in 
China.
As argued earlier, considering the interaction effects of R&D spending 
and bribery, because these variables can interact in determining innovative 
performance across provinces, is important. We see that all the interaction effects 
GRD*COR are positive and statistically different from zero (see column (1) of Table 
3). Most of the evidence suggests that the effect of R&D expenditure on NPA is 
influenced by the level of corruption and that corruption helps increase the effect 
of R&D expenditure in China. That is because bribery can reduce administrative 
intervention, promote administrative efficiency, and help enterprises receive 
government innovation subsidies. However, the cost of bribery is so high that 
enterprise innovation ability cannot fundamentally improve and, so, the effect of 
GRD on NPA is still statistically insignificant.
We also add regional dummy variables and their interaction variables with 
COR, as shown in columns (2) to (4) in Table 3. Consistent with earlier findings, 
both the coefficients of Eastern and Central and their interaction terms with COR 
appears to be statistically significant, with a positive impacts on NPA, whereas 
the coefficient in regression (4) is not statistically different from zero, implying 
that the level of innovation in the western area is low compared to the eastern and 
central areas. Additionally, concerning the other explanatory variables, we find 
their effects to also be similar to our earlier findings.
Table 4.
 Effects of Corruption and Government R&D Expenditure on NPG
This table shows the effects of corruption and government R&D expenditure on the number of patents granted. The t-statistics are 
given in parentheses following each coefficient. Finally, ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
NPG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NPGt-1 0.301** 0.211** 0.676** 0.443**
[3.009] [5.989] [4.556] [6.765]
GRD 0.434** 0.233** 0.212** 0.334**
[6.009] [5.123] [3.093] [6.162]
COR 0.203** 0.155** 0.232** 0.054
[4.122] [2.099] [4.097] [1.098]
GRD*COR 0.208** 0.335** 0.509** 0.032
[4.554] [4.098] [11.344] [0.087]
GDP 0.403** 0.229* 0.445** 0.228**
[2.088] [1.734] [7.246] [5.232]
FDI 0.343** 0.209** 0.554** 0.023**
[10.340] [2.121] [2.354] [2.342]
OPEN 0.412** 0.113** 0.032 0.229**
[6.093] [5.203] [1.093] [4.095]
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Table 4 shows the GMM regression estimates for dependent variable NPG. 
These estimates are consistent with evidence reported in Table 3, apart from the 
variable GRD, which appears to be positive and statistically significant at least at 
the 5% level in all columns. Generally, our results provide clear findings on the 
relationships between R&D expenditure, corruption, and enterprise innovation. In 
other words, enterprises establish relationships with government officials through 
bribery to obtain R&D funding support, reduce political resistance against their 
projects, and speed up the process of patent applications and authorization.
C. Extended specification: Effects of corruption on the ratio of the number of patents 
granted to the number of patent applications
To confirm robustness, we again examine the influence of GRD, COR, and the 
interaction term GRD*COR on the ratio of the number of patents granted to the 
number of patent applications (RGA). Given that Hirshleifer et al. (2012) argues 
for RGA being a suitable indicator to proxy for the effectiveness of innovative 
performance, we change the explained variable to RGA, with the results reported 
in Table 5.
NPG
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Eastern 0.105**
[5.099]
Eastern*COR 0.512**
[6.034]
Central 0.023**
[2.656]
Central*COR 0.433**
[7.056]
Western -0.746
[-0.334]
Western*COR 0.189
[0.665]
Observations 328 328 328 328
ARtest (1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ARtest (2) 0.665 0.657 0.387 0.558
Instruments 19 13 11 7
Hansen test 0.201 0.405 0.765 0.746
Table 4.
 Effects of Corruption and Government R&D Expenditure on NPG (Continued)
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This table shows the effects of corruption on the ratio of the number of patents granted to the number of patent applications (RGA). 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses following each coefficient. Finally, ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level.
RGA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RGAt-1 0.103** 0.255** 0.344** 0.552**
[2.094] [4.088] [4.099] [6.003]
GRD 2.093** 1.143** 1.654** 0.223
[5.088] [3.556] [3.095] [1.110]
COR 0.332** 0.544** 0.884** 0.328**
[5.940] [6.093] [4.034] [6.934]
GRD*COR 0.121** 0.133** 0.154** 0.664**
[5.102] [6.202] [4.746] [3.956]
GDP 0.340** 0.335** 0.774** 0.176**
[3.930] [3.454] [3.493] [3.948]
FDI 0.203** 0.745** 0.229** 0.847**
[4.066] [3.009] [3.087] [2.887]
OPEN 0.103** 0.098** 0.224** 0.554**
[2.034] [4.835] [3.098] [6.093]
Eastern 0.887**
[2.933]
Eastern*COR 0.403**
[5.098]
Central 0.233**
[6.855]
Central*COR 0.233**
[6.855]
Western 0.103
[0.235]
Western*COR -0.002
[-0.934]
Observations 328 328 328 328
ARtest (1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ARtest (2) 0.211 0.398 0.455 0.283
Instruments 23 15 13 9
Hansen test 0.645 0.553 0.932 0.847
Table 5.
Effect of Corruption on RGA
As before, the adjustment of the dependent variable does not substantially 
influence our findings. Here, GRD, COR, and the interaction term GRD*COR 
still present statistically significant positive effects on RGA in most cases; the 
results continue to support our earlier analysis. Enterprises do establish opaque 
relationships with government officials through bribery and try to obtain R&D 
funding from the government for innovation. Overall, the impacts of the control 
variables on RGA in Table 5 are mostly consistent with our earlier models, as our 
evidence makes clear.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper integrates corruption into the estimation of how R&D expenditure 
affects enterprise innovation for Chinese provinces. We find that R&D expenditure 
presents an unobvious influence on the number of patent applications but 
does lead to greater numbers of patents granted. Though the finding seems 
controversial, it becomes more interesting after we add corruption and its 
interaction term with R&D expenditure to the model. In particular, we find that 
the incidence of corruption and the interaction term with R&D expenditure mostly 
impact innovation positively. The implication is that corruption can contribute 
to connecting together enterprises and government, thus speeding up patent 
applications and authorizations granted.
The findings of this study are consistent with the predictions of previous 
studies, indicating that corruption plays an important role in facilitating and 
easing the operation of administrative procedures for examination and approval, 
especially in developing countries. The current study confirms these phenomena 
in China, which is also an economy in transition, with lower institution quality 
and administrative transparency.
Although this study demonstrates that corruption is positively related to the 
numbers of patent applications and patents granted in China, it does not mean that 
corruption itself makes a positive contribution. Institutional deficiencies such as red 
tape in bureaucracy, lack of administrative transparency, information asymmetry, 
and so forth create opportunities for corruption as a shortcut to overcome these 
constraints in government and administrative procedures. In other words, the 
lower the quality of the institutional framework, the higher the country’s level of 
corruption. When institutions are relatively efficient, observed corruption is likely 
to be associated with relatively lower functionality. Conversely, in countries with 
low-quality institutions (e.g., excessively burdensome regulations), corruption 
can lead to relatively more functionality. In fact, corruption is both a major cause 
and a result of low-quality institutions. Therefore, although the findings of this 
study show that corruption is the lubricant of enterprise innovation, it is due to 
the deficiency in institutional quality and leads to the replacement of formal and 
legal institutions with informal and corrupt “rules of the game.” The proposition 
that corruption can improve efficiency is expected to be hold only when the costs 
of institutional deficiency exceed the benefits of corruption under ill-governed 
regimes.
In particular, over the past five years, a series of anticorruption measures have 
been adopted by the Chinese government to improve legal and regulatory systems; 
an anticorruption campaign is thus being consolidated and continues to build. 
This example reflects the structural reforms in institutional quality in China, even 
though the corrupt ties between business and government are hard to remove in 
the short term, as shown by our findings. Once institutional quality is improved, 
the moderating effect of corruption on the relationship between R&D expenditure 
and enterprise innovation is expected to have a lesser impact.
Our findings lead to important policy recommendations since policymakers 
and enterprises need to investigate more closely the causes of R&D expenditure 
across provinces to promote growth in innovative activity. Although anticorruption 
activities in China might not be favorable to enterprise innovation at present, since 
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they could destroy the original ties between governments and business persons 
and thus reduce the administrative efficiency of local and central governments, 
this period of economic and institutional reforms is a painful stage for China. 
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